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Fourth, the Agreement was reached on the basis of mutual respect and friendly negotiations. Most terms of the Agreement were about how to handle internal relations and affairs of Tibet. For these issues, the plenipotentiary representatives of the Cen-tral People’s Government took initiatives to offer some propos-als in line with the ethnic policy of the central government and the reality in Tibet. The Tibetan representatives also raised their suggestions. The Central People’s Government studied and adopted some, while patiently explaining the reasons for not accepting others. Representative Tubdain Daindar talked about his experience of the talks: “As an ecclesiastic official from the Yitsang (Secretariat), I offered many suggestions about religious beliefs, monastery income and some other related issues, most of which were adopted by the central government.” A Han-language version and a Tibetan-language one of the Agreement were prepared from the very beginning of the talks. And every revision made in both versions was only with consent from the Tibetan delegation. After the talks, both versions were signed and issued together.

As plenipotentiary representatives from the local govern-ment of Tibet, they discussed and established the following principles before formal talks: “Plenipotentiary representatives shall quickly decide on terms that they can decide on, and report to the Kashag in Yadong those that they cannot settle”; and when there was not enough time, “the plenipotentiary representatives can decide first and then report to the Dalai Lama.” The channel for the Tibetan delegation to ask for instructions from the Dalai Lama and the Kashag was always unimpeded, and the representatives discussed among themselves for which items they would request instructions. Soon after the talks started, the issue of the PLA’s entry into Tibet arose. The Tibetan represent-atives telegraphed the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in Yadong via cryptograph brought by Kemai Soinam Wangdui and Tubdain Daindar, saying that there would not be a big problem regarding most of the items, but if the local government of Tibet did not permit the PLA to enter Tibet, the talks could fail. During the talks, they contacted the Kashag in Yadong twice regarding its relationship with the Panchen Lama. During the 20-odd-day talks, although representatives from the two sides disagreed on some items, the talks went on in a friendly and sincere atmos-phere and with full consultation. At the signing ceremony, the representatives of the two sides signed and sealed both versions of the Agreement.

To ensure that the Agreement was earnestly implemented, the Central People’s Government and the local government of Tibet signed two appendices to the Agreement, and one was the Regulations on Matters Concerning the Entry and Stationing of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet. Regarding the PLA’s entry into and stationing in Tibet, the plenipotentiary representatives of the local government of Tibet questioned the number and deployment of and supplies for the troops. Since these details were military secrets, they could not be written in the Agreement, which was to be announced. Thus it was necessary to put them in Appendix I. Appendix II was the Declaration on the Local Government of Tibet Being Responsible for Carrying out the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. If the Dalai Lama acknowledged the Agreement and returned to Lhasa, then the peaceful liberation of Tibet would be a natural result. But if he did not return to Lhasa for some time for whatever reason, the Tibetan delegation hoped that the Central People’s Government would allow the Dalai Lama to choose his own place of residence during the first year of the implementa-tion of the Agreement, and to retain his status and power un-changed if he returned to his original post during this year. The Central People’s Government consented. But if this clause was written into the Agreement, it would provoke controversy. So the two sides agreed on preventive stipulations for future possi-bilities and wrote them into this appendix. These two appendices were detailed rules for the implementation of the Agreement and complements to the Agreement on matters that had not been covered in the Agreement.

Fifth, the Agreement gained support from the Dalai Lama and both ecclesiastical and secular people in Tibet. After Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme returned to Lhasa from Beijing, the local gov-ernment of Tibet held between September 26 and 29, 1951 an “officials’ meeting” attended by more than 300 people, includ-ing all ecclesiastical and secular officials, Khenpo (abbot) rep-resentatives of the three most prominent monasteries, and Tibetan army officers above the regimental-commander rank. At the meeting, a report to the Dalai Lama was approved. It stated, “The 17-Article Agreement that has been signed is of incom-parable benefit to the grand cause of the Dalai Lama and to Buddhism as a whole, and to the politics, economy and other aspects of life in Tibet. Naturally it should be carried out.” The Dalai Lama sent a telegram to Chairman Mao Zedong on October 24 to express his support for the Agreement. The telegram read, “This year the local government of Tibet sent five delegates with full authority, headed by Kalon Ngapoi, to Beijing in late April 1951 to conduct peace talks with delegates with full authority appointed by the Central People’s Government. On the basis of friendship, the delegates of the two sides signed on May 23, 1951 the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The local government of Tibet as well as the ecclesiastical and secular people unanimously support this Agreement, and, under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central People’s Government, will actively assist the PLA troops entering Tibet to consolidate national defense, ousting imperialist influences from Tibet and safeguarding the unification of the territory and the sovereignty of the motherland. I hereby send this cable to inform you of this.” On October 26, Chairman Mao Zedong telegraphed the Dalai Lama in reply, expressing thanks for his efforts in carrying out the Agreement.

The signing of the 17-Article Agreement symbolized the peaceful liberation of Tibet, thus opening a new page in the history of social progress in Tibet. The peaceful liberation enabled Tibet to shake off imperialist aggression and imperialist political and economic fetters, safeguarded the national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of China, enhanced the solidarity among all ethnic groups of China and within Tibet, and created the basic preconditions for Tibet to advance and develop together with other parts of the country.

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